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Abstract 
One of the recent findings in the economics of climate change is that emissions control plays 
a significant role in the reduction of the tail-effect of fat-tailed uncertainty on welfare. The 
current paper gives another perspective: the learning-effect. The effect of emissions control 
on welfare is decomposed into the direct effect and the learning-effect. Although this has 
been known for thin-tailed uncertainty in the literature, this paper takes a different approach: 
the changes in temperature distributions under fat-tailed uncertainty and learning. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the recent findings in the economics of climate change is that optimal carbon tax does 
not accelerate for many plausible situations as the uncertainty about climate change increases  
(Karp, 2009; Hwang et al., 2013a, b; Millner, 2013; Horowitz and Lange, 2014), as implied 
by Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem (Weitzman, 2009). This is because emissions control, 
together with investment, which was absent in the model of Weitzman (2009), plays a 
significant role in the reduction of the effect of fat-tailed uncertainty on welfare (the tail-
effect).  
Beside its direct impact, emissions control has an implicit impact on welfare in that carbon 
emissions produce information on the true state of the world through increased warming. 
Since learning or the (partial) resolution of uncertainty has value, this should be accounted 
for when the decision on emissions control is made.  
The hypothesis of this paper is that the possibility of learning reduces the marginal benefits 
of emissions control, compared to the case where there is no learning. As a result, learning 
reduces the stringency of climate policy compared to the no-learning case. Although this has 
been known for thin-tailed uncertainty in the literature (e.g., Kolstad, 1996a, b; Ulph and 
Ulph, 1997; Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Webster, 2002; Ingham et al., 2007), this paper takes a 
different approach: the changes in temperature distributions under fat-tailed uncertainty. This 
approach is also taken by Pindyck (2011, 2012) and Millner (2013), but their models are too 
stylized and furthermore do not account for learning.  
Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 and 4 investigate the changes in temperature 
distribution and the rate of tail-slimming (Weitzman, 2013), respectively. The main results 
are given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2 The Model 
The learning-effect is discussed in this paper with a simple dynamic model as in Equation (1). 
The problem of a decision maker is to choose the rate of emissions control in each period so 
as to maximize social welfare defined as the discounted sum of expected utility of 
consumption.  
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where   is social welfare,   is time period,   is the rate of emissions control,   is the 
utility function,   is the discount factor,   is the expectation operator,   is consumption 
per capita,       is an uncertain parameter such as the equilibrium climate sensitivity,     
is the set of any variable, and    is the probability distribution function (PDF) of  .  
A unit increase in carbon emissions induces higher temperature in the future through 
Equations (2-4). 
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where   is the carbon stock,   is the emission-output ratio,   is gross output per capita,   
is the depreciation rate of the carbon stock,    is radiative forcing from the carbon stock, 
    is radiative forcing from a doubling of carbon dioxide,   is air temperature deviations 
from the initial period, and   is a constant.  
Equation (4) says that a doubling of carbon dioxide induces a temperature increase of  , 
the equilibrium climate sensitivity. Without loss of generality it is assumed that     , 
     , and      in this paper.  
Carbon emissions reduce expected social welfare due to the loss of consumption as a 
consequence of adverse climate change (Equation 5). Thus the decision maker tries to control 
the amount of carbon emissions. Emissions control comes at a cost as in Equation (6). 
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where   is the abatement cost function,  (>0),   (>0),   (>1) and  (>1) are economic 
parameters. For simplicity   is normalized to be one. 
Equations (2-6) and the conditions for the parameter values are generally consistent with 
the literature (e.g., Gregory and Forster, 2008; Nordhaus, 2008; Weitzman, 2012).  
The hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility function is applied in this model. 
Note that the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, usually used in the 
literature, is a special case of HARA. If     (7) becomes CRRA. 
 (  )            
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where  ,  (≥0), and  (>0) are parameters. It is assumed that  (    )  ⁄    for utility to be 
increasing and concave in consumption.  
The uncertain parameter is assumed to have a fat-tailed distribution in the sense that 
probability density diminishes slowly than exponentially in the upper tail (Weitzman, 2009; 
Pindyck, 2011). In this paper the distribution of Roe and Baker (2007) is applied, which is 
widely discussed in the literature (e.g., Weitzman, 2009; Millner, 2013). Applying the other 
fat-tailed distributions does not affect the general findings of this paper, as argued in Hwang 
et al. (2013). The notation for time is dropped for convenience, unless otherwise confused.  
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where   ̅ and    are the parameters of the climate sensitivity distribution,    is a constant. 
To solve the learning model, the random variable is transformed to derive the PDF of 
temperature increases as follows.  
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where    is the PDF of future temperature increases and  ( )  (      )   . Note that    is 
a fat-tailed distribution in that    
   
      (   )⁄    for any    .  
3 Temperature Distribution and Tail-slimming Rate 
The parameters    and   ̅ are subject to change in the learning model. For instance, the 
belief of the decision maker on the climate sensitivity can be updated as information (e.g., 
temperature records) accumulates (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999). In the Bayesian statistics 
literature, with a normal likelihood function, it is well known that the posterior mean tends to 
the (pre-specified) true value and the posterior variance approaches zero asymptotically over 
time (Cyert and DeGroot, 1974). With this in mind and without loss of generality, it is 
assumed that   ̅   ⁄   . The general findings of this paper are not affected by this 
assumption. In addition, following the literature on learning (e.g., Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; 
Leach, 2007) it is assumed that       ⁄   . For instance, Hwang et al. (2014) find that 
     
     
 (    
      
   
 ⁄ )⁄ , where   
  is the variance of temperature shocks and    is a 
parameter. Since      ⁄   , it is clear that       ⁄  (     ⁄ )  (     ⁄ )   . Together 
with the fact that      ⁄    from Equation (2-4), this translates into      ⁄  (     ⁄ )  
(      ⁄ )     
The PDFs of temperature increases for three hypothetical scenarios are illustrated in Figure 
1. Distribution 1 refers to the case where radiative forcing is doubled relative to the pre-
industrial level. Distributions 2 and 3 refer to the cases where there is learning (a 50% 
reduction in   
 ) and there is a 50% reduction in carbon emissions, respectively compared to 
the case for Distribution 1. Since this paper focuses on the tail-effect, only the probability 
density of the upper tail is considered below. This is reasonable in that the upper tail 
dominates the others in a usual cost-benefit analysis under deep uncertainty (Weitzman, 
2009). As shown in the figure, for any   in the upper tail, probability density increases in 
radiative forcing (      ⁄   ). Likewise, for any   in the upper tail, probability density 
increases in uncertainty (      ⁄   ). 
 Figure 1 PDFs of temperature increases  
 
One of the important things to be considered in the economics of catastrophic climate 
change is the rate of tail-slimming in the bad tail (Weitzman, 2013). If the tail-slimming rate 
of the upper tail is slower than the one for objective function, willingness to pay to avoid 
catastrophic climate change becomes arbitrarily large.  
The tail-sliming rate at temperature    in the upper tail can be defined as in Equation (10). 
Since the fatness of the PDF decreases as temperature increases in the upper tail, the negative 
sign is attached in Equation (10).  
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As expected, the tail-sliming rate is increasing in radiative forcing (see also Figure 2). This 
means that carbon emissions play a role in reducing the fatness of the upper tail, other things 
being equal. In addition, the tail-sliming rate is increasing in uncertainty as in Equation (11). 
This implies that learning is faster for larger uncertainty. 
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Figure 2 Tail-sliming rate of each distribution in Figure 1 
 
4 The Learning-effect 
From Equation (1), optimal climate policy should satisfy the first order condition as follows. 
For simplicity arguments of each function are dropped. 
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The left hand side (LHS) of Equation (12) is the marginal abatement costs, whereas the 
right hand side (RHS) is the expected marginal benefits of emissions control (or the expected 
marginal avoided damage costs). 
Without loss of generality we consider a three-period problem below. For the last period it 
is assumed that      and     (  ). The problem is recursively solved by backward 
induction (Bellman and Dreyfus, 1962). If   
  is assumed to be a solution for the second 
period, given   , the maximized social welfare   
  is calculated as in Equation (13).
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The first order condition for the first period reads: 
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where        (      ̅    ),        (  ),   ̅    ̅(  ),        (  ).   
Substituting Equation (13) into Equation (14) and rearranging lead to Equation (15).  
                                                          
1
 Hwang et al. (2013a) investigates the conditions for the convergence of RHS in Equation (12) under the no-
learning case.  
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Equation (15) says that the marginal benefits of emissions control are the discounted sum 
of the expected marginal social welfare. The last term of RHS can be decomposed applying a 
chain rule: 
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The last term in the bracket of RHS can be further decomposed into Equation (17). Note 
that it has been assumed that    ̅    ⁄   . 
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The first term of RHS in Equation (17) reflects the effect of emissions control on the PDF 
of temperature increases through the changes in radiative forcing, whereas the second term is 
added because the parameters of the distribution change as learning takes place. Thus the 
second term is named the ‘learning-effect’ hereafter.2  
                                                          
2
 Note that the PDF of temperature increases for the second period     changes only by radiative forcing. 
After observing information in the second period the decision maker updates her PDF for the upcoming period. 
The conditions for RHS in Equation (15) to converge do not change from the no-learning 
case of Hwang et al. (2013), since the first term in RHS dominates the other terms regarding 
the existence of solutions.  
It is clear that (     ⁄ )  (  
 
   ⁄ )    and (     ⁄ )  (      ⁄ )    in the upper tail 
from Figure 1. These relations imply that the learning-effect offsets to some extents the effect 
of deep uncertainty on welfare. The marginal benefits of emissions control falls as the 
decision maker learns, and thus the optimal level of emissions control or carbon tax decreases 
when there is a possibility of learning, compared to the no-learning case. 
The offsetting ratio is calculated as in Equation (18). The ratio grows in three conditions: 1) 
the quality of information that carbon emissions produce (     ⁄   ) increases, 2) carbon 
emissions are larger (    ), and 3) the level of learning is larger (   
 ⁄ ). 
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Finally let us consider the case for active learning. Active learning refers to the case where 
the decision maker explicitly affects the rate of learning (see Hwang et al., 2013c). If the 
decision maker invests on climate science to raise the speed of learning (R > 0, where R is the 
amount of investment), and if research is effective in reducing uncertainty (     ⁄  < 0), then 
the offset ratio becomes far larger (see Equation 18). Consequently, there is an additional 
reduction of the marginal benefits of emissions control, hence the less stringent climate 
policy.  
5 Conclusion 
The effect of learning under fat-tailed uncertainty has been investigated in this paper using a 
simple dynamic model. The effect of emissions control on welfare is decomposed into the 
direct effect and the learning-effect. Main findings of this paper are that the possibility of 
learning reduces the marginal benefits of emissions control, compared to the case where there 
is no learning. As a result, learning reduces the stringency of climate policy. The fatter is the 
tail of the distribution and the faster is learning the larger is the learning-effect. Hwang et al. 
(2013c, 2014) investigate this issue with numerical models. 
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